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42 U.S.C. § 1983-EXHAUSTION OF STATE ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES-The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit has held that state administrative remedies, where ade-
quate and appropriate, must be exhausted before proceeding
with a section 1983 action in a federal court.
Patsy v. Florida International University, 612 F.2d 946 (5th Cir.
1980), vacated on rehearing, 634 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3213 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1981) (No. 80-1874).
Georgia Patsy, a white female secretary at Florida Interna-
tional University (FIU or University) brought an action under 42
U.S.C. § 19831 against the University in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Florida.2 In the com-
plaint, she alleged that during her employment at FIU she was
uniformly rejected from numerous employment openings in the
University because the University engaged in a pattern and
practice of racial and sexual discrimination in violation of the
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) (amended 1980) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (Supp. III 1980)), states in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be sub-jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within thejurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or im-
munities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
Id. Patsy asserted jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1976) which states in
relevant part:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
authorized by law to be commenced by any person:
(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, or-
dinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity
secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Con-
gress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the
jurisdiction of the United States.
Id.
2. Patsy v. Florida Int'l Univ., 612 F.2d 946, 946 (5th Cir. 1980), vacated
on rehearing, 634 F.2d 900 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3213 (U.S.
Oct. 5, 1981) (No. 80-1874).
3. The plaintiff was employed as a "Secretary III" in the personnel office
at the time the suit was commenced in February, 1979. She began employment
at FIU in June of 1972 as a "Clerk Typist III." Brief for Appellee at 5.
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Constitution' and laws of the United States.5 The plaintiff con-
tended that FIU segregated applicants' files according to race
and sex and sought out individuals from minority groups to hire
and promote.'
Naming the Board of Regents of the State of Florida as defen-
dants on behalf of FIU,7 Ms. Patsy requested that the court pro-
mote her to the next available position for which she had applied
and for which she was qualified or, in the alternative, award her
$50,000 actual and punitive damages! The district court granted
the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint because the
plaintiff had failed to exhaust administrative remedies, in accord
with the general rule that plaintiffs must exhaust available ad-
ministrative remedies before seeking judicial relief.9
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, provides in relevant part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.
Id The fourteenth amendment was applicable because the Board of Regents,
representing FIU, was considered a part of the state. See infra note 7.
5. 634 F.2d at 902.
6. Id.
7. Brief for Appellee at 3, 612 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1980). Patsy originally filed
the complaint against FIU but was required to amend it because FIU lacked
capacity to be sued. The defendant Board of Regents is a ten-member corporate
state agency that serves as Director, Division of Universities, Department of
Education, State of Florida. The Board of Regents operates and manages the
State University System, which includes FIU and eight other state universities,
with state appropriated funds. Id at 5.
8. 634 F.2d at 902.
9. Id This rule applies to both state and federal administrative remedies.
See Illinois Commerce Comm'n v. Thompson, 318 U.S. 675 (1943); Myers v.
Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938); Gilchrist v. Interborough
Rapid Transit Co., 279 U.S. 159 (1929); 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, §
20.01, at 56-57 (1958).
In support of the motion to dismiss, the defendants in Patsy offered a
memorandum outlining the administrative remedies available to Career Service
employees under the State University System. The Florida International
University career service employee (CSE) grievance procedure, FLA. ADMIN.
CODE R. 6C8-4.05, requires an employee to seek redress from his immediate
superior and on up through the FIU chain of command. Appeal can be taken to
the Florida Director of Personnel in the Department of Administration who
may then issue a final decision. The Director, however, lacks enforcement
authority. Id.
Having completed the CSE grievance procedure, the employee may, if dis-
satisfied, file a complaint with the Human Relations Commission (HRC). FLA.
[Vol. 20:319
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On appeal, a panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
versed, maintaining that the United States Supreme Court had
ruled that exhaustion of state administrative remedies was not a
prerequisite for a section 1983 suit."0
On rehearing en banc," however, the court of appeals held that
state administrative remedies, where adequate and appropriate,
must be exhausted before proceeding with a section 1983 action
in federal district court." Judge Roney, writing for the majority,"
first discussed the policy purposes for requiring exhaustion of
federal administrative remedies, such as the desire to conserve
scarce judicial resources and to improve the administrative pro-
cess, as articulated in McKart v. United States.' In addition, the
ADMIN. CODE R. 9D-9. After completing the necessary evaluations by the Ex-
ecutive Director, HRC General Counsel, and the HRC Hearing Officer, none of
whom have enforcement authority for their decisions, the employee may appeal
to the appropriate Florida circuit. 634 F.2d at 925-28 (Hatchett, J., dissenting).
Based upon Patsy's failure to mention in her complaint any effort made to
obtain relief through these remedies, the district court dismissed. Id at 913-14.
10. Patsy v. Florida Int'l Univ., 612 F.2d at 946 (5th Cir. 1980). Judge
Godbold was joined by Judges Reavley and Anderson. See Ellis v. Dyson, 421
U.S. 426 (1975); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974); Gibson v. Berryhill,
411 U.S. 564 (1973).
The panel decision also held that the district court's reliance on Penn v.
Schlesinger, 497 F.2d 970 (5th Cir. 1974), was misplaced because Penn involved
a 42 U.S.C. § 1981 suit, not a section 1983 action. 612 F.2d at 947. 42 U.S.C. §
1981 provides in relevant part: "All persons within the jurisdiction of the
United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory ... as is
enjoyed by white citizens..." The Fifth Circuit in Penn, sitting en banc, rea-
soned that because litigants were traditionally required to exhaust available
federal administrative remedies before commencing their suit in federal court,
the plaintiffs should be required to exhaust the remedies available under the
Civil Service Commission. The case was remanded with instructions to dismiss.
497 F.2d at 971.
11. 634 F.2d at 900.
12. Id. at 914.
13. Id. at 901. Joining in the majority opinion were Chief Judge Coleman
and Judges Brown, Ainsworth, Godbold, Charles Clark, Gee, Tjoflat, Hill, Fay,
Garza, Henderson, Reavley, Politz, Anderson, Randall and Tate.
14. 395 U.S. 185, 193-95 (1969). In McKart the validity of a selective service
reclassification order was challenged in federal court during a criminal pro-
ceeding for refusing induction. As a matter of statutory interpretation McKart
was not required to administratively appeal the order. The policy purposes
behind the normal requirement for exhaustion, as set forth in McKart, were to:
(1) avoid premature interruption of the administrative process; (2) let the agency
develop the necessary factual background upon which decisions should be based;
(3) permit the agency to exercise its discretion or apply its expertise; (4) im-
prove the efficiency of the administrative process; (5) conserve scarce judicial
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court stated that considerations of federalism and comity weigh
against federal intervention in a dispute involving state action."i
The court acknowledged that practical exceptions to the exhaus-
tion doctrine are required to properly balance the claimant's
rights against the policy purposes favoring the rule."6 Indicating
resources, because the complaining party may be successful in vindicating
rights in the administrative process and the courts may never have to inter-
vene; (6) give the agency a chance to discover and correct its own errors; and (7)
avoid the possibility that frequent and deliberate flouting of administrative pro-
cesses could weaken the effectiveness of an agency by encouraging people to ig-
nore its procedures. Id. at 193-95. See DAVIS, supra note 9, at 642-44 (Supp.
1970) (describes the McKart decision as a long-awaited clarification of the
Court's exhaustion doctrine and the reasons for it).
15. 634 F.2d at 903. The court cited several nonexhaustion cases, not in-
volving section 1983, for the purpose of showing the general prohibition against
federal intervention in state proceedings. See National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), involving application of the 1974 amendments of the
Fair Labor Standards Act, which extended the statutory minimun wage and
maximum hours provisions to employees of states and their political subdivi-
sions. The Court ruled these provisions to be over-extensions of the commerce
clause power. Congress may not exercise power in a way that impairs the
states' integrity or their ability to function effectively in a federal system. 426
U.S. at 852. In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), a criminal defendant in a
state proceeding sought federal injunctive relief on grounds that the state
statute was unconstitutional. The Court denied relief because prima facie un-
constitutionality is not a sufficient basis for injunctive relief, and federal courts
are forbidden from enjoining pending state criminal proceedings absent a great
and immediate danger of irreparable injury. 401 U.S. at 46. In Railroad Comm'n
v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941), an order of the Texas Railroad Commission
forbidding operation of sleeper cars without a Pullman conductor (white) was at-
tacked by Pullman porters (blacks) as discrimination against Negroes in viola-
tion of the fourteenth amendment. The Court ruled that scrupulous regard for
the rightful independence of state governments and for the smooth working of
the federal judiciary required giving the state courts an opportunity to make a
definitive ruling on the case before federal intervention. 312 U.S. at 501.
16. 634 F.2d at 903-04. The court listed the traditional exceptions to the re-
quirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies: (1) when the prescribed ad-
ministrative remedy is plainly inadequate because either no remedy is avail-
able, or the available remedy will not give relief commensurate with the claim,
or the remedy would be so unreasonably delayed as to create a serious risk of
irreparable injury; (2) when the claimant seeks to have a legislative act declared
unconstitutional and administrative action will leave standing the constitutional
question; (3) when the question of the adequacy of the administrative remedy is
essentially co-extensive with the merits of the plaintiff's claim, e.g., where the
plaintiff contends that the administrative system is unlawful or unconstitutional
in form or application; and (4) when it is futile to comply with the procedures
because the claim will clearly be rejected. See, e.g., Annot., 47 A.L.R. FED. 15
(1980); DAVIS, supra note 9, § 20.07, at 97-100 (1958 and Supps. 1970, 1976 and
1980).
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that the application of these exceptions is not an exact science
but one that requires careful analysis and a balancing of com-
peting interests," the court queried whether it should adopt the
analytical approach'8 applied in other administrative remedy
cases or apply a blanket no-exhaustion rule to all section 1983
cases.
19
The majority examined this question in light of relevant Su-
preme Court cases. The court first observed that in Monroe v.
Pape,"0 the Court had held that state judicial remedies need not
be exhausted before filing a section 1983 action, but the question
of the exhaustion of state administrative remedies had not been
addressed.2' The court also noted that in McNeese v. Board of
Education,22 which involved exhaustion of both state administra-
17. 634 F.2d at 904. See DAVIS, supra note 9, at 56-57.
18. By analytical, the court is referring to a flexible case-by-case deter-
mination whether exhaustion should be required. This is in contrast with a
blanket no-exhaustion rule which allows the court no room for analysis. 634
F.2d at 904.
19. Id.
20. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). In Monroe, a suit was filed in a federal district
court by a husband and wife against Chicago police officers and the city of
Chicago alleging that the officers broke into the plaintiffs' home and searched it
without a warrant and arrested and detained the husband without a warrant or
arraignment in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In response to the defendants'
assertion that the plaintiffs were required by Supreme Court precedent to ex-
haust the available Illinois State judicial remedies prior to asserting their claim
in federal court, the Court ruled that the federal remedy under section 1983 for
deprivation of civil rights was supplementary to the state remedy. It need not
be sought and refused before the federal remedy was invoked. 365 U.S. at 183.
See, e.g., DAVIS, supra note 9, at 644-45 (Supp. 1970); S. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS
AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION, § 2.02, at 34-36 (1979); Comment, Limiting the
Section 1983 Action in the Wake of Monroe v. Pape, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1486
(1969).
21. 634 F.2d at 904.
22. 373 U.S. 668 (1963). McNeese involved a section 1983 suit brought in
federal district court by Negro students in the Illinois public school system
against alleged racial segregation. Id at 669. The suit was dismissed by both
the district court and the court of appeals on the grounds that the plaintiffs failed
to exhaust administrative remedies available under an Illinois statute. The
statute provided that a certain minimum number or proportion of the school
district (50 people or 10/o, whichever is less) file a complaint with the
Superintendent of Public Instruction alleging racial segregation and that if the
Superintendent finds the charge substantially correct that he request the At-
torney General to bring suit to correct it. Id. at 670. The Supreme Court
reversed the lower courts on the ground that in its earlier opinion in Monroe v.
Pape the Court held that the federal remedy was supplementary to the state
remedy and that the state one need not be invoked first. Additionally, the
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tive and judicial remedies, the Supreme Court had held that fail-
ure to first resort to state proceedings did not defeat relief
under the Civil Rights Acts. 23 The court determined, however,
that exhaustion of administrative remedies in McNeese would
not have been required even if it were not a section 1983 case
because present in the case was a recognized exception to the
exhaustion requirement: inadequate administrative remedies.24
The court concluded that subsequent cases relying upon
McNeese, despite McNeese's falling within a recognized excep-
tion, have nevertheless developed the rule, relied -upon by most
circuits, that exhaustion is never required in section 1983 suits.2"
Avoiding the question of whether the Court in McNeese ever in-
tended to establish this no-exhaustion rule, the majority concluded
that the Supreme Court does not follow such a rule now and, if
such a rule were to be sustained, it would come only after the
issue is squarely presented and thoroughly considered.26
To support its conclusion, the court analyzed two recent
Supreme Court cases, Gibson v. Berryhil27 and Barry v. Barchi.28
Court stated that it was by no means clear that the Illinois statute in fact pro-
vided a remedy sufficiently adequate to preclude prior resort to the federal
court. Id at 674-75. See generally DAVIS, supra note 9, § 20.01, at 645-46 (Supp.
1970); NAHMOD, supra note 20, § 5.10, at 144-46; Sullivan, Exhaustion in Section
1983 Cases, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 537, 543-46 (1974).
23. 634 F.2d at 904-05.
24. Id at 905. See supra note 16.
25. 634 F.2d at 905.
26. Id
27. 411 U.S. 564 (1973). The plaintiffs in Gibson had been charged with un-
professional conduct within the meaning of a state optometry statute because
they were practicing optometry under the employment of a company, not in-
dependently. Id at 567. They filed a section 1983 suit in federal district court to
enjoin hearings scheduled before the Alabama Board of Optometry. Id. at 569.
The Supreme Court held that the district court was warranted in enjoining the
proceedings and in concluding that the Board's make-up of independent op-
tometrists disqualified them from passing on the decision. Id. at 578-79. How-
ever, because the Alabama statute did not preclude the optometrists from prac-
ticing as employees of corporations, the Court vacated and remanded for futher
consideration. Id. at 580-81.
28. 443 U.S. 55 (1979). After his horse-trainer's license was temporarily
suspended under New York state law as a result of the discovery of a drug
found in one of his horses in a post-race urinalysis, id at 59, the plaintiff in
Barry filed suit directly in a federal district court rather than pursue the
available state remedies. Id at 61. Barchi alleged, inter alia, that the statute in
question violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment because
it permitted his license to be revoked without a pre-suspension hearing and be-
324 [Vol. 20:319
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Significantly for the court, it concluded that in Barry the
Supreme Court did not merely recite a no-exhaustion rule, but
rather focused on another traditional exception to the no-exhaus-
tion rule: where the question of the adequacy of the administra-
tive remedy is practically identical to the merits of the lawsuit. 9
For Judge Roney, the fact that the Supreme Court went to the
trouble of finding and using traditional exceptions to the exhaus-
tion rule indicated that the Court did not adhere to a rigid no-ex-
haustion rule. 0 This is further supported by Gibson v. Berryhill,3'
in which, according to the court, the Supreme Court indicated
that the question of a no-exhaustion rule was still unsettled.2
Moreover, the court noted that Justice Marshall and Justice
Brennan, in concurring opinions in Gibson, joined in the majority
opinion except so far as it suggested that the question of exhaus-
tion remained open.3
The Patsy court recognized that the Supreme Court has stated
apparently quite categorically that exhaustion is not required in
section 1983 cases. However, the court pointed out that all the
Supreme Court cases addressing this issue involved inadequate
state administrative remedies and fell within one of the tradi-
cause a summary suspension could not be stayed pending administrative
review. Id In accepting this contention the Court also rejected the state's pre-
liminary objection that Barchi should not have commenced the federal action
prior to exhausting his available administrative remedies. Quoting from Gibson
v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973), the Barry Court stated that exhaustion of ad-
ministrative remedies is not required when the question of the remedies' ade-
quacy is, for practical purposes, "identical with the merits of the plaintiff's law-
suit." 443 U.S. at 63 n.10 (quoting Gibson, 411 U.S. at 564).
29. 634 F.2d at 905. An example of this is where the plaintiff asserts the
unconstitutionality of the administrative procedure either in form or practice.
Because this question goes to the heart of the plaintiff's alleged harm and re-
quires the agency to make a determination it is unqualified to make, the ex-
haustion requirement is waived. See supra note 16 & 27. See, e.g., DAVIS, supra
note 9, § 20.00-4, at 139-40 (Supp. 1980).
30. 634 F.2d at 906.
31. 411 U.S. 564 (1973). See supra note 27.
32. 634 F.2d at 906. "Whether this [exhaustion of state administrative
remedies] is invariably the case . . . is a question we need not now decide ....
Thus, the question of the adequacy of the administrative remedy, an issue
which under federal law this District Court was required to decide, was for all
practical purposes identical with the merits of appellees' lawsuit." Gibson, 411
U.S. at 574-75.
33. 634 F.2d at 906. See 411 U.S. at 581 (Marshall & Brennan, JJ., concur-
ring).
34. 634 F.2d at 906.
32519821
Duquesne Law Review
tional exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine. 5 Judge Roney
35. Id at 906-07. See Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426 (1975). After being con-
victed and fined for violating a Dallas loitering ordinance, id at 428, the defen-
dant in Ellis brought an action directly in federal district court under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343 (3) and (4) challenging the constitutionality of the
ordinance. Id. at 429-30. Dismissed in the district court because federal
declaratory and injunctive relief were unavailable absent a showing of bad faith
or harassment, the case was affirmed by the court of appeals. Id at 430-31. The
Supreme Court reversed, citing its decision in Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452
(1974), and reiterating that exhaustion of state judicial or administrative
remedies is unnecessary in section 1983 actions. 421 U.S. at 432.
In Steffel, an action was filed in a federal court for injunctive and
declaratory relief from an allegedly unconstitutional Georgia criminal trespass
law the violation of which the police threatened to charge the petitioner if he
did not stop handbilling against the Vietnam war. 415 U.S. at 455-56. The
federal district court dismissed, and the court of appeals affirmed, on the
grounds that there was no actual controversy and that the same standards of
bad faith and harassment that applied to federal injunctive relief also applied to
declaratory relief. Id at 456-57. The Supreme Court reversed on the grounds
that there was an actual controversy despite the absence of pending state ac-
tions, that declaratory relief was not dependent upon a showing of bad faith or
harassment, and that it is immaterial whether the attack is made on the prima
facie unconstitutionality of a state criminal statute or its applicaton. Further-
more, the Court noted that requiring the federal courts to refuse relief unless a
charge were pending would turn federalism on its head and that when claims
are properly premised on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 no such federal deference to state
judicial or administrative remedies is required. I& at 472-73. The Patsy major-
ity reasoned that the statements in Steffel and Ellis concerning exhaustion of
state administrative remedies were strictly dicta. 634 F.2d at 907.
Carter v. Stanton, 405 U.S. 669 (1972), involved a challenge to an Indiana
welfare regulation that required a six-month separation of the spouse before
eligibility for Aid For Dependent Children was dismissed by the federal district
court for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 405 U.S. at 670-71. Citing
Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416 (1967), the Court reversed on the grounds
that exhaustion is not required in these circumstances.
After their state habeas corpus petitions were dismissed, the petitioners in
Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971) (per curiam), sought and were
denied federal habeaus corpus on the grounds that they had failed to invoke
state judicial alternatives to habeas corpus, such as a suit for injunction or writ
of mandamus. Id at 249-50. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, did not require repetitious ap-
plications in the state courts. Furthermore, citing Monroe v. Pape, Damico v.
California, and Houghton v. Shafer, the Court ruled that the prisoners'
pleadings also could have been read to plead causes of action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, where the federal remedy was supplementary to the state remedy which
need not be sought before the federal one was invoked. 404 U.S. at 251. Accord-
ing to the Patsy majority, the Wilwording Court's discussion of administrative
remedies was dictum. 634 F.2d at 907.
While the petitioner in Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639 (1968) (per curiam),
was in jail pursuing an appeal of a burglary conviction, his law books, trial
records and other materials were confiscated by prison officials because they
326 [Vol. 20:319
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asserted that several of the Supreme Court justices have ex-
pressed dissatisfaction with a blanket no-exhaustion rule in sec-
tion 1983 cases."6 Moreover, he maintained that the Court, by
were in the possession of another inmate in violation of prison regulations. Id.
at 640. The Court ruled that the petitioner's bringing an action in federal court,
without exhausting available administrative remedies, was appropriate because
of the futility of the administrative remedies and because in any event, in light
of previous decisions in Monroe, McNeese, and Damico, resort to these
remedies was unnecessary. Id at 640.
In King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968), the Supreme Court held that an
Alabama regulation declaring a man who cohabited with a mother receiving Aid
For Dependent Children (AFDC) a "substitute father," regardless of any marital
relationship or any obligation to support the children and thereby disqualifying
the mother for AFDC benefits, was invalid because it was inconsistent with sec-
tion 406(a) of the Social Security Act. Id. at 333. The Court also rejected the
state's argument that administrative remedies must first be exhausted, stating
that this requirement was waived where the constitutional challenge is suffi-
ciently substantial to require the convening of a three-judge court. Id. at 312
n.4.
In Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416 (1967) (per curiam), welfare claimants
asserted that a state law establishing a three-month separation requirement for
nondivorced mothers to be eligible for welfare was unconstitutional. Id
Dismissed by the federal district court because of the claimants' failure to ex-
haust adequate administrative remedies, id. at 416-17, the case was reversed by
the Supreme Court on the basis of the Court's holding in McNesse v. Board of
Education that the Civil Rights Act provided a federal remedy supplementary
to any remedy any state may have. Id. at 417.
See Comment, Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90
HARV. L. REV. 1133, 1274 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Developments in the Law].
See also Note, Exhaustion of State Administrative Remedies Under the Civil
Rights Act, 8 IND. L. REV. 565, 570 (1975). See supra note 16.
36. 634 F.2d at 907. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 prohibits private commercially operated nonsectarian schools from deny-
ing admission to Negro students). The Patsy majority relied upon Justice
Powell's concurrence in Runyon in which he alluded to what he considered the
extreme interpretations given to some of the Civil Rights Acts, especially 42
U.S.C. § 1983. In Justice Powell's opinion, the no-exhaustion rule resulted largely
without the benefit of briefing or argument. 427 U.S. at 186 n.* (Powell, J., con-
curring). See Note, supra note 35, at 570. See also City of Columbus v. Leonard,
443 U.S. 905 (1979) (once state remedies are invoked, they must be exhausted
prior to commencing a federal suit). The Patsy majority relied upon Justice
Rehnquist's dissent to the denial of certiorari. 634 F.2d at 907-08. After noting
that the Court had earlier held in Monroe v. Pape that "[A] federal plaintiff
need not initiate state proceedings before filing a § 1983 action," Leonard, 443
U.S. at 910 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), Justice Rehnquist went on to say: "Quite
apart from this distinction [between invoking the federal remedy before the
state action is initiated rather than after] the time may now be ripe for a recon-
sideration of the Court's conclusion in Monroe that the 'federal remedy is sup-
plementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and
refused before the federal one is invoked.' " Id. at 910-11 (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting Monroe, 365 U.S. at 183).
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holding in Huffman v. Pursue7 that a plaintiff was required to
appeal an adverse state court decision prior to filing a section
1983 action, 8 indicated that failure to exhaust state remedies will
sometimes preclude the federal action.
Finally, the court noted the unevenness of treatment given by
the federal courts to federal officials, against whom actions must
first be pursued under federal administrative remedies, and
state officials, against whom actions can be taken directly to
federal court. The court expressed a concern that this uneven-
ness would be destructive of good federalism and burdensome to
the courts. 0 The court concluded, based upon its analysis of
these cases, that it was not prevented by Supreme Court prece-
dent from taking an analytical approach to the question of ex-
haustion of state administrative remedies.4' This conclusion was
supported, according to the majority, by the division among the
circuits on this question.42
37. 420 U.S. 592 (1975). In Huffman an owner of a pornographic movie
theater filed a section 1983 suit directly in a federal court rather than appeal a
state judgment that declared his establishment a nuisance and therefore sub-
ject to closing for one year under a state statute. The Court held that absent
Younger-type extraordinary circumstances, the state proceedings must be
allowed to proceed. Id. at 611. While conceding that Huffman dealt with judic-
ial, not administrative remedies, the Patsy court nevertheless found the opinion
strongly indicative of what it considered to be the Supreme Court's flexible ap-
proach to section 1983. 634 F.2d at 908.
38. 420 U.S. at 611.
39. 634 F.2d at 908.
40. Id. This concern was voiced by Judge Friendly in Eisen v. Eastman,
421 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1970). In Eisen, a landlord
filed suit in a federal district court against the New York City district rent and
rehabilitation director, challenging the constitutionality of the city rent control
law, the general levels of rent allowed under it, and the propriety of the direc-
tor's reducing maximum rents. The suit was dismissed on the grounds that the
Civil Rights Act did not apply to suits against municipalities. 421 F.2d at 562.
The decision was affirmed on the grounds that section 1343 (3), see supra note
1, jurisdiction did not extend to property rights, only civil rights, and that
therefore a section 1983 action did not arise. 421 F.2d at 566-67.
41. 634 F.2d at 908.
42. Id. Six circuits-the third, fourth, fifth, sixth, eighth and tenth-have
concluded that the Supreme Court has established a blanked no-exhaustion rule.
See Simpson v. Weeks, 570 F.2d 240 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 911
(1979); Ricketts v. Lightcap, 567 F.2d 1226 (3rd Cir. 1977); Hardwick v. Ault, 517
F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1975); McCray v. Burrell, 516 F.2d 357 (4th Cir. 1975), cert.
dismissed, 426 U.S. 471 (1976); Gillette v. McNichols, 517 F.2d 888 (10th Cir.
1975); Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972).
Four circuits-the first, second, seventh, and ninth-have applied more flexi-
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Judge Roney next considered whether the court should take
an analytical approach to exhaustion in section 1983 cases.43 He
began by addressing the two basic arguments used in favor of a
blanket no-exhaustion rule: An exhaustion requirement would
thwart Congress's purposes in enacting section 1983, and be-
cause of the nature of the rights being protected by section 1983
claimants are entitled to federal court adjudication." The court
examined the first argument in light of Monroe v. Pape5 in
which, according to the majority, the Supreme Court identified
three main purposes of the legislation surrounding section 1983:48
To override certain kinds of state laws that were inconsistent
with federal law; to provide a federal remedy where state law
was inadequate; and to provide a federal remedy where the state
remedy was available in theory but not practice."
As to the first purpose, the Patsy court felt that even when a
state law was considered discriminatory and therefore in consis-
tent with federal law exhaustion may still be appropriate for,
among other things, developing a factual record and raising the
expertise of the responsible agency. 8 Concerning the second and
third purposes, the court considered a requirement of exhausting
adequate administrative remedies consistent with the intent to
ble approaches. See Secret v. Brierton, 584 F.2d 823 (7th Cir. 1978); Canton v.
Spokane School Dist. #81, 498 F.2d 840 (9th Cir. 1974); Raper v. Lucey, 488 F.2d
748 (1st Cir. 1973); Blanton v. State Univ., 489 F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1973); Eisen v.
Eastman, 421 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1970); Toney v.
Reagan, 467 F.2d 953 (9th Cir. 972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1130 (1973). See
generally Annot., 47 A.L.R. FED. 15 (1980).
43. 634 F.2d at 909-10.
44. Id.
45. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). See supra note 20.
46. Section 1983 is based upon the Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17
Stat. 13 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1976)).
It received little attention for the next 90 years primarily due to the restrictive
judicial interpretation given to the meaning of "under color of state law." In the
1940's the Supreme Court finally opened the action to encompass more than
just those actions attributable directly to the states themselves. See, e.g.,
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S.
299 (1941). See Comment, supra note 35, at 1135-50.
The Monroe court maintained that Congress was more concerned with dis-
criminatory enforcement of state statutes than with the statutes themselves.
365 U.S. at 174-80.
47. 634 F.2d at 910 (citing 365 U.S. at 173-74).
48. 634 F.2d at 910. See Comment, Exhaustion of State Administrative
Remedies in Section 1983 Cases, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 537, 553 (1974).
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protect litigants against inadequate remedies: if state administra-
tive remedies are adequate, there is no need for the protection of
a blanket no-exhaustion rule.49
In response to the argument that section 1983 litigants are en-
titled to a federal remedy, the majority felt that pursuing ade-
quate administrative remedies could only postpone, not preclude,
federal action because the administrative proceedings carry no
res judicata or collateral estoppel effect with them into federal
court.5" Section 1983 cases, according to the court, should focus
on relief from wrong and the adequacy of the administrative
system to provide a remedy, not on the federal origin of the
right.51
The court then discussed controlling policy reasons for requir-
ing exhaustion of adequate state administrative remedies: To
promote wiser allocation of judicial resources; to assure that the
complained action is ripe for adjudication; to improve the admini-
strative process; to prevent waste of the litigant's resources; and
to promote fundamental notions of federalism and comity."2 The
court found that the last reason was based on the states' con-
stitutionally based interest in autonomy, the concern that cir-
cumventing state administrative procedures would undo much of
the federal courts' efforts to prescribe due process requirements
for state agencies, and the general requirement that plaintiffs ex-
haust federal administrative procedures.53
Considering these policy reasons and their bases the court de-
cided that, absent any of the traditional exceptions to the ex-
haustion doctrine," adequate state administrative remedies must
be exhausted prior to commencing a section 1983 suit in a federal
court.55 The court insisted that this decision affected only the
procedural steps required before prosecuting a section 1983 suit
and in no way limited the substantive rights protected under it.5"
49. 634 F.2d at 910.
50. Id at 911. See NAHMOD, sup'ra note 20, § 5.17, at 160 n.185.
51. 634 F.2d at 910.
52. Id at 911-12. See McKart, 395 U.S. at 193-95. See also DAVIS, supra
note 9, at 642-44 (Supp. 1970); Note, supra note 35, at 566-68.
53. 634 F.2d at 912. The court asked why state defendants should have
greater rights than federal defendants in terms of not having to resort to ad-
ministrative remedies. Id See DAVIS, supra note 9, at 646 (Supp. 1970).
54. See supra note 16.
55. 634 F.2d at 912.
56. Id
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Judge Roney then enumerated five minimum conditions that
must be met before requiring an exhaustion of available state ad-
ministrative remedies: An orderly system of review or appeal
must be available; the agency must be able to grant relief com-
mensurate with the claim; relief must be available within a rea-
sonable time period; procedures must be fair, not unduly burden-
some, and not used to harass; and interim relief must be
available in appropriate circumstances to prevent irreparable in-
jury.57 In addition, once these minimum conditions have been
met, the majority required that courts examine the particular ad-
ministrative scheme, the nature of the interest the plaintiff seeks
to protect, the values served by the exhaustion doctrine, and
that the courts properly balance these interests.' In response to
the argument that requiring exhaustion would "turn back the
clock" on civil rights law, the court stated that the necessary
development of speedy and effective state administrative
remedies would in fact advance the protection of civil rights by
providing less expensive, less time consuming and more easily
understood procedures. 9
Applying its decision to Ms. Patsy's case, the court found that
the district court record did not indicate whether Patsy had at-
tempted to obtain relief through administrative procedures or
whether the available administrative remedies 0 were adequate
in terms of the conditions established by the majority. 1 The
court therefore remanded the case to allow Patsy to amend her
complaint and to allow the district court to determine the ade-
quacy of the available remedies and whether an exception to the
requirement for exhaustion was present.2
Writing in dissent, Judge Rubin 3 disagreed with the majority's
disregard for the numerous instances where the Supreme Court
has stated that exhaustion is not required in section 1983 cases."
57. Id. at 912-13.
58. Id. at 913. See McKart, 395 U.S. at 193; supra note 14.
59. 634 F.2d at 913.
60. See supra note 9.
61. 634 F.2d at 914.
62. Id.
63. 634 F.2d at 914 (Rubin, J., dissenting). Judge Rubin was joined by
Judges Vance, Frank M. Johnson, Jr., Hatchett, and Sam Johnson.
64. Id. at 914 (Rubin, J., dissenting). See cases cited supra note 35;
NAHMOD, supra note 20, § 5.10, at 144-46 (the Supreme Court has never re-
quired exhaustion of state administrative remedies in a section 1983 case).
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Conceding that some of the Justices have intimated that there is
a need or desirability for re-evaluating the no-exhaustion rule,
Judge Rubin argued that the Court has never actually abandoned
the doctrine."
The majority had concluded that in Wilwording v. Swenson"6
the Supreme Court had referred to exhaustion of state adminis-
trative remedies in dicta only.67 Judge Rubin disagreed with that
conclusion, asserting that the Supreme Court must have been
aware of the considerations of federalism and comity relied on by
the majority in Patsy and that the policy of no-exhaustion was
the basis of the Court's decison in Wilwording.8 The Wilwording
Court, Judge Rubin maintained, was also aware of the desirabil-
ity of giving civil rights plaintiffs the swiftest and least costly
form of relief and of the legislative intent to redress violations of
federal constitutional rights that the states refused to protect. 9
Judge Rubin speculated that the majority may have felt that
Patsy's claim was not ripe because of the general lack of informa-
tion concerning the University's actions and the plaintiff's alleged
injuries. 0 Correspondingly, he believed that questions about
ripeness may have warranted a remand to the district court but
not the adoption of an exhaustion rule. Finally, he was concerned
65. 634 F.2d at 914 (Rubin, J., dissenting). Judge Rubin noted that despite
the majority's reliance on Barry v. Barchi and Gibson v. Berryhil, see supra
notes 27-33 and accompanying text, the Court did not abandon its no-exhaustion
requirement in these cases. 634 F.2d at 914.
66. 404 U.S. 249 (1971). See supra note 35.
67. 634 F.2d at 907.
68. Id. at 915 (Rubin, J., dissenting). Judge Rubin cited the Wilwording
Court's holding that "[tlhe remedy provided by [the Civil Rights Act] 'is supple-
mentary' to the state remedy and the latter need not be first sought and refused
before the federal one is invoked." Id (quoting 404 U.S. at 251).
69. 634 F.2d at 915 (Rubin, J., dissenting). See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S.
225 (1972); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
70. 634 F.2d at 916 (Rubin, J., dissenting). Ripeness is satisfied at the mo-
ment a controversy becomes justiciable: at the time a defendant is "committed
to conduct that would raise the proferred issues for decision." 13 C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 3532, at 247
(1969). Ripeness requires an actual, concrete dispute between the parties which
can be resolved judicially, and normally requires that the defendant's conduct
has had some practical effect on the plaintiff. As a result, ripeness is normally
not at issue any time damages are part of the requested relief. NAHMOD, supra
note 20, § 5.06, at 138-39. See also, DAVIS, supra note 9, § 21 (1958 and Supps.
1970, 1976, 1980); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
54-83, 100-11 (1978).
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that, despite the majority's belief in the ability of state adminis-
trators and judges to vindicate federal rights and fashion pro-
cedural measures to protect them, the requirement of "remedy
exhaustion" may instead turn out to be "litigant exhaustion."1
In a separate dissent, Judge Kravitch stated that no Supreme
Court opinion authorized a lower court to change the no-exhaus-
tion rule."2 In his judgment, such a change must await congres-
sional action or a Supreme Court reversal."
In a lengthy dissent, Judge Hatchett74 asserted that the ma-
jority opinion contravened numerous Supreme Court decisions,
presumed a congressional intent never articulated by Congress,
usurped congressional authority, and created a procedural night-
mare that would have a chilling effect on civil rights litigation."
Referring to the majority's observation that all the cases in
which the Supreme Court stated that exhaustion was not re-
quired were situations in which exhaustion of administrative
remedies would not have been required because of inadequate
administrative remedies," Judge Hatchett asked why the Su-
preme Court would bother articulating an absolute no-exhaustion
rule if it were not required. It was not for the court of appeals,
according to Judge Hatchett, to assume that the Supreme Court
had made meaningless, gratuitous statements.7 Furthermore, he
reasoned that the Court has had numerous opportunities to re-
treat from its original no-exhaustion pronouncement but that in
each case it has refused to do so." To this dissenter, the deci-
sions in McNeese 79 and later cases represented a natural judicial
effort to allow full implementation of the Civil Rights Act of
1871.8
Conceding that there is confusion in these cases partly because
they fall within the traditional exceptions to the exhaustion rule
71. 634 F.2d at 916 (Rubin, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 916 (Kravitch, J., dissenting).
73. Id
74. Id. at 916 (Hatchett, J., dissenting). Joining Judge Hatchett were
Judges Rubin, Vance, Frank M. Johnson, Jr., and Thomas A. Clark.
75. Id. at 917 (Hatchett, J., dissenting).
76. Id. See supra note 35.
77. 634 F.2d at 917 (Hatchett, J., dissenting).
78. Id. See, e.g., Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 841 (1970). See supra note 40.
79. See supra note 22.
80. 634 F.2d at 917 (Hatchett, J., dissenting). See supra note 46.
1982] 333
Duquesne Law Review
and partly because of the Supreme Court's brief explanations,81
Judge Hatchett nevertheless contended that careful examination
of the Supreme Court's decisions removes any confusion sur-
rounding the Court's no-exhaustion declaration. 2 He examined
the history of section 1983, from its passage as part of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871,8 through its years of dormancy, to Monroe v.
Pape 1 and the resulting dramatic increase in federal civil rights
litigation. 5 Judge Hatchett acknowledged that the first three
purposes of section 1983, as articulated by the Monroe Court and
relied upon by the majority, 6 could have been achieved by a
properly tailored exhaustion rule. 7 He focused, however, on a
fourth purpose listed in Monroe: To provide a federal remedy
supplementary to the state remedy, one that was not dependent
upon the state remedy being first sought and refused.8 It is this
critical fourth purpose, according to the dissenter, that the ma-
jority failed to recognize, except obliquely. 9
Judge Hatchett then traced the expansion of the no-exhaustion
rule from state judicial remedies in Monroe to state administra-
tive remedies in McNeese v. Board of Education.0 Admitting
that the McNeese Court based its decision partly on the inade-
81. 634 at 917-18 (Hatchett, J., dissenting). See Note, supra note 35, at 570
(confusion over no-exhaustion rule arises partly from factual circumstances of
the cases and partly from the puzzling brevity of the Court's opinions).
82. 634 F.2d at 918 (Hatchett, J., dissenting).
83. See supra note 46.
84. See supra note 20.
85. 634 F.2d at 918 (Hatchett, J., dissenting). In 1960, fewer than 300
federal suits were brought under all of the Civil Rights Acts. ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 1960 ANNUAL REPORT 232 Table C2
(1960). See, e.g., Comment, supra note 35, at 1169-72. Since 1961 the number of
federal civil rights cases brought annually has grown to 994 in 1965, 3,985 in
1970, 10,392 in 1975, and 12,944 in 1980. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS, 1965 ANNUAL REPORT 105 (1965); 1970 ANNUAL REPORT 109,
Table 14 (1970); 1975 ANNUAL REPORT 194, Table 17 (1975); 1980 ANNUAL
REPORT 230, Table 19 (1980).
86. See supra text accompanying notes 46-49.
87. 634 F.2d at 918-19 (Hatchett, J., dissenting).
88. Id. (quoting Monroe, 365 U.S. at 183).
89. 634 F.2d at 919 (Hatchett, J., dissenting). Judge Hatchett was referring
to the majority's reliance on Justice Rehnquist's dissent in City of Columbus v.
Leonard, 443 U.S. 905 (1979). See supra note 36. To Judge Hatchett, Justice
Rehnquist's call, in Leonard, for reassessing existing no-exhaustion policy was
an invitation only, one that was declined by the majority. 634 F.2d at 919 (Hat-
chett, J., dissenting).
90. Id. See supra note 22.
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quacy of the state administrative remedy, he stated that the
McNeese Court also relied upon the critical fourth purpose ar-
ticulated in Monroe." To Judge Hatchett, subsequent Supreme
Court interpretations of McNeese show conclusively that state
administrative remedies need not be exhausted, even when ade-
quate.92
This dissenter also examined the majority's discussion of Gibson
v. Berryhill," deeming the majority's reliance on Gibson's intima-
tion that exhaustion might be required in limited circumstances
misplaced because the intimation was in dicta.9" In support of his
interpretation of Gibson, Judge Hatchett pointed out that the
91. 634 F.2d at 920 (Hatchett, J., dissenting). "[Rielief under the Civil
Rights Act may not be defeated because relief was not first sought under state
law which provided a remedy." Id. (quoting McNeese, 373 U.S. at 671).
92. 634 F.2d at 920 (Hatchett, J., dissenting). Specifically, the dissent
stated that Damico v. California, 389 U.S. 416 (1967), erased any doubt about ex-
haustion by confirming that McNeese stood for the proposition that "relief
under the Civil Rights Act may not be defeated because relief was not first
sought under state law which provided an administrative remedy." 389 U.S. at
417. See supra note 35. According to the dissent, the majority's insistence that
Damico rested upon the inadequacy of the state administrative remedies missed
the fact that the Damico Court refused to base its decision on this ground. 634
F.2d at 920-21 (Hatchett, J., dissenting).
. Similarly, Judge Hatchett cited language in other Supreme Court cases that
rejected the argument favoring exhaustion and in each case reiterating
McNeese's no-exhaustion policy. 634 F.2d at 921 (Hatchett, J., dissenting) (citing
Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249 (1971); Houghton v. Shafer, 392 U.S. 639
(1968); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968)). See supra note 35. See also, Com-
ment, supra note 48, at 544-47.
Judge Hatchett then cited the Court's reliance upon the Damico findings in
Carter v. Stanton, 405 U.S. 669 (1972), where a lower court dismissal of a com-
plaint was vacated because Damico "established that exhaustion is not required
in circumstances such as those presented." 405 U.S. at 671. The dissent reasoned
that, as in McNeese and Damico, the Carter Court refused to rest its decision
on the inadequacy of the administrative remedy. 634 F.2d at 921-22 (Hatchett,
J., dissenting).
93. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
94. 634 F.2d at 922 (Hatchett, J., dissenting). See NAHMOD, supra note 20, §
5.10, at 145. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974). The Steffel Court
stated: "When federal claims are premised on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. §
1343(3)-as they are here-we have not required exhaustion of state judicial or
administrative remedies, recognizing the paramount role Congress has assigned
to the federal courts to protect constitutional rights." 415 U.S. at 472-73. See
supra note 35.
In Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426 (1975) the Court maintained that "exhaustion
of state judicial or administrative remedies in Steffel was ruled not to be
necessary, for we have long held that an action under section 1983 is free of
that requirement." 421 U.S. at 432-33. See supra note 35.
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Supreme Court had clearly reaffirmed the no-exhaustion rule in
cases decided after Gibson.95
Judge Hatchett also cited Barry v. Barchi," stating that its
real significance was that the Court had not retreated from its
no-exhaustion rule, and not, as the majority stated, that the
Court had focused on a traditional exception to it.97 Turning to
the majority's arguments against the no-exhaustion rule for
reasons of federalism and comity, this dissenter reasoned that
good federalism did not demand unreasoned acquiescence to
state interests but rather a balancing of competing federal and
state interests.98 He asserted that this balance was not possible
when the federal half of the system is crippled.99 To Judge Hat-
chett, the history of section 1983 shows the need for an indepen-
dent federal remedy in addition to state mechanisms to protect
civil rights.'00
For Judge Hatchett, the difference noted by the majority be-
tween the requirement for exhaustion of federal administrative
remedies in section 1983 cases and the absence of such a require-
ment for state administrative remedies'1 merely illustrated the
difference between federal and state roles in vindicating civil
95. 634 F.2d at 922 (Hatchett, J., dissenting).
96. See supra note 28.
97. 634 F.2d at 922 (Hatchett, J., dissenting). See supra text accompanying
note 28.
98. 634 F.2d at 923 (Hatchett, J., dissenting). See Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. at 44. See supra note 15.
99. 634 F.2d at 923 (Hatchett, J., dissenting). See Brennan, State Constitu-
tions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 503 (1977).
100. 634 F.2d at 923 (Hatchett, J., dissenting). In Judge Hatchett's opinion,
the purpose of section 1983's forerunner, see supra note 46, was to "interpose
the federal courts between the States and the people as guardians of the peo-
ple's federal rights." 634 F.2d at 923 (Hatchett, J., dissenting) (quoting Mitchum
v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238-39 (1972)). Also, "[i]f there is one thing certain about
the legislative history of the Act, it is that Congress, open-eyed, deliberately
set out to alter the so-called 'delicate balance' between the state and the federal
government so that federal courts could effectively protect federal rights." 634
F.2d at 923 (Hatchett, J., dissenting) (quoting Moreno v. Henckel, 431 F.2d 1299,
1305 (5th Cir. 1970)). Finally, "[t]he absence of an exhaustion requirement in §
1983 is not an accident of history or the result of careless oversight by Con-
gress or this Court .... Exhaustion of state remedies is not required precisely
because such a requirement would jeopardize the purposes of the .Act." 634
F.2d at 924 (Hatchett, J., dissenting) (quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
475, 518 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).*
101. See supra text accompanying note 40.
[Vol. 20:319
Recent Decisions
rights. 12 The federal role, to Judge Hatchett, is totally inconsistent
with the majority's dilution of section 1983 cases with an exhaus-
tion requirement, deferring to state interests to the detriment of
both federal and private ones. 03 He believed that the no-exhaus-
tion rule should not be abolished because, among other reasons,
existing Supreme Court policy and congressional intent will be
violated. 104 Judge Hatchett admonished that the most uncons-
cionable aspect of the majority's opinion was its chilling effect on
civil rights litigation. He concluded that exhaustion of state ad-
ministrative remedies had no place in the civil rights context. 105
Both the Patsy majority and dissenters relied primarily on
Supreme Court precedents in deciding whether exhaustion of
state administrative remedies should be required in section 1983
102. 634 F.2d at 924 (Hatchett, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 924-26 (Hatchett, J., dissenting). See Comment, Exhaustion of
State Remedies, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1201, 1206-07 (1968).
104. 634 F.2d at 924-25 (Hatchett, J., dissenting). Judge Hatchett listed six
additional reasons for sustaining the no-exhaustion rule. First, the federal
courts, not state administrative bodies, have the expertise to resolve federal
issues such as section 1983 claims. Second, requiring the use of state adminis-
trative processes may discourage aggrieved individuals from seeking recourse.
To support this contention Judge Hatchett described the administrative pro-
cedures Patsy must follow before she would have access to the federal courts
under the majority's ruling. See 634 F.2d at 927-28, app. A; supra note 9. Third,
the majority opinion may create a procedural nightmare. Judge Hatchett
described a likely scenario that could occur under the majority's ruling: The
plaintiff would file suit in a federal court, the defendant would move for a
dismissal, the federal court would then have to determine if administrative
remedies were adequate, and, if so, the plaintiff would pursue these remedies
until they were exhausted and then return to federal court to continue suit. 634
F.2d at 925-26 (Hatchett, J., dissenting). Fourth, the typical state administrative
process is not designed to provide adequately for the award of attorney's fees.
The dissent noted that in the event that a litigant prevails in the state adminis-
trative process he normally would be required to go to federal court to recover
attorney's fees and costs. Id at 926 (Hatchett, J., dissenting). Attorney's Fees
Awards Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976) (provides for federal courts to award at-
torney's fees in section 1983 cases). See also NAHMOD, supra note 20, § 1.17, at
25. Fifth, most administrative processes cannot adequately entertain class ac-
tion claims, vindicating an individual's rights but not necessarily other class
members. Finally, friction between the states and federal judiciary can only in-
crease under a system that requires a federal judge to determine the adequacy
of state administrative remedies. To illustrate this, Judge Hatchett queried
what will happen if a remedy is judged inadequate. Will the state be under a
duty to amend its statutes and regulations for the next litigant? If a state
disagrees with the federal finding, may it appeal? May the state appear in the
adjudicatory hearing? 634 F.2d at 926 (Hatchett, J., dissenting).
105. 634 F.2d at 926 (Hatchett, J., dissenting).
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cases. Extensive examination of the same cases by these oppos-
ing sides resulted in conflicting interpretations. An evaluation of
the validity of these conflicting interpretations is aided by the
fact that the Supreme Court has never actually renounced its
position that exhaustion of state administrative remedies is not
required in section 1983 cases.100 The majority, however, concluded
that the Court's frequent reliance on the traditional exceptions
to the exhaustion rule alone acts to nullify the no-exhaustion
policy." 7
The Patsy court's reliance on several of the cases used to sup-
port its decision may have been misplaced. The majority cited
Huffman v. Pursue 101 as evidence that the no-exhaustion rule is
not immutable.1" Huffman, however, dealt with whether state
judicial, not administrative remedies, must be exhausted before
the federal courts will assert jurisdiction. The majority also
relied upon Eisen v. Eastman,11 but failed to indicate that Eisen
only decided whether section 1983's protection extended to prop-
erty rights."' Similarly, the majority relied upon Justice Rehn-
quist's dissent from the Court's denial of certiorari in City of
Columbus v. Leonard"2 to demonstrate the Court's willingness to
re-examine the no-exhaustion rule. Leonard is not supportive,
however, because the issue there was not whether exhaustion
was never required in section 1983 cases but whether, once a
state remedy was initiated, the litigant was bound by his choice
to pursue that remedy to its conclusion. Moreover, the cited por-
tion of Justice Rehnquist's dissent calling for a re-evaluation of
the no-exhaustion rule was dicta,1 and by relying upon his in-
vitation to reconsider the Court's no-exhaustion rule, the Patsy
majority implicitly conceded that the Supreme Court had imposed
a no-exhaustion rule in section 1983 cases.
Although the Patsy court maintained that federal treatment of
106. NAHMOD, supra note 20, § 5.10 at 145.
107. See, e.g., supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
108. 420 U.S. 592 (1975). See supra note 37.
109. 634 F.2d at 908.
110. 421 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1970). See supra
note 40. Apparently, the majority cited Eisen to show that the Second Circuit
used a rationale similar to their own in urging that exhaustion was sometimes
appropriate and that this rationale was not reversed by the Supreme Court.
111. See supra note 40.
112. 443 U.S. 905 (1979). See supra note 36.
113. 443 U.S. at 910-11 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See supra note 36.
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section 1983 cases is burdensome to the courts,"' figures com-
plied by the Administration Office of the U.S. Courts show that
following the surge of civil rights cases filed after Monroe v.
Pape and McNeese v. Board of Education, the relative number of
civil rights cases has actually dropped. Civil rights cases have
gone from 8.90/o of the total civil cases in 1975115 to 7.7/o in
1980."1 Contract cases, on the other hand, have risen from 19.5/o
of the total civil cases filed in 197517 to 29.1/o in 1980.118 The ma-
jority, then, stands in the position of urging federal deferment to
the states for protection of constitutionally guaranteed civil
rights that represent less than 8% of the total federal civil case-
load, while nearly a third of the federal caseload is devoted to
the settlement of non-constitutionally protected contract dis-
putes.
Patsy is significant because the Fifth Circuit has reversed its
previous policy of no-exhaustion in section 1983 cases. In two re-
cent cases, Hardwick v. Ault" 9 and Mitchell v. Beaubouef,20 the
courts have held that state administrative remedies need not be
exhausted before a state prisoner contesting conditions of con-
finement may file a section 1983 suit in a federal court. The
114. See supra text accompanying note 40.
115. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1975 ANNUAL REPORT 195
(1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 ANNUAL REPORT].
116. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 1980 ANNUAL REPORT 226
(1980) [hereinafter cited as 1980 ANNUAL REPORT].
117. 1975 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 115, at 195.
118. 1980 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 116, at 226.
119. 517 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1975). In Hardwick, the plaintiff, a state prisoner,
filed suit directly in a federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging interference
with his right to receive newspapers, books, and writing materials. After the
case was dismissed by the district court without prejudice for failure to exhaust
the available state administrative remedies, id at 296, the Fifth Circuit held
that in civil rights actions challenging conditions of confinement, as opposed to
its fact or duration, prisoners were not required to exhaust their state ad-
ministrative remedies, regardless of their adequacy. Id. at 298.
120. 581 F.2d 412 (5th Cir. 1978). In Mitchell, three inmates of the Louisiana
State Penitentiary, alleging deprivation of due process of law in a prison disci-
plinary hearing, filed a pro se complaint in a federal district court. Relying upon
a magistrate's unverified administrative report, the court dismissed the suit
with prejudice, granting leave to the plaintiffs to appeal in forma pauperis. 581
F.2d at 414. In ruling that the district court's reliance upon the unverified
report in granting a summary judgment violated the requirements in FED. R.
CIV. P. 56, the court of appeals noted that, in accordance with Hardwick, see
supra note 119, a prisoner is not required to exhaust state administrative pro-
ceedings when challenging conditions of confinement. 581 F.2d at 416.
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court's holding in Patsy will require either an extension of the
Fifth Circuit's new exhaustion policy to all types of section 1983
actions or a distinguishing of confinement from non-confinement
actions to preserve the rights established in Hardwick and Mit-
chell. The Patsy decision will also align the Fifth Circuit with
the other circuits that have adopted a flexible no-exhaustion
policy.
The Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari to Patsy2 '
to consider three issues:' (1) whether the Fifth Circuit's require-
ment for exhaustion of adequate state administrative remedies in
section 1983 cases conflicts with Supreme Court holdings; (2)
whether the Patsy holding is inconsistent with congressional in-
tent as illustrated by the recent enactment of a limited exhaus-
tion requirement in section 7 of the Civil Rights of Institu-
tionalized Persons Act;" and (3) whether the Patsy court erred
in requiring exhaustion where the defendant failed to demon-
strate that such remedies would be plain, speedy, and effective,
and where the agency with final authority is not empowered to
grant the requested relief.2 '
121. See supra note 42.
122. Patsy v. Florida Int'l Univ., 50 U.S.L.W. 3213 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1981)
(80-1874).
123. See Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at i. The issues presented for con-
sideration, as reported in the United States Law Week, are nearly identical to
the three issues presented in Patsy's petition.
124. Act of May 23, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-247, 94 Stat. 352 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1997e (1980)). The statute requires the U.S. Attorney General to adopt
minimum standards for the development and implementation of a speedy, effec-
tive grievance system for adults confined in correctional facilities. It further
provides for the states to apply to the Attorney General for certification of
their grievance procedures. Once he certifies these procedures, if an adult
prison inmate brings a section 1983 action regarding prison conditions, the
federal district court may continue the case for a maximum of 90 days to allow
exhaustion of the certified procedures. No provision is made in the Act for a
dismissal of the suit pending exhaustion of state administrative remedies. 42
U.S.C. § 1997e (1980).
Patsy argues that by establishing very narrow exhaustion requirements in a
limited context,. Congress has indicated there are no exhaustion requirements in
other applications. See Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 22-34.
125. Patsy argues that even if the Court rejects the first two arguments,
the decision of the court of appeals should be reversed because it is inconsistent
with even the narrowest reading of McNeese v. Board of Education. See supra
note 22. According to Patsy, McNeese stands at least for the rule that exhaus-
tion is not required where the state has failed to carry its burden of proving
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The Court's treatment of the first two issues, which squarely
address the questions of Supreme Court and congressional policy
on section 1983, will have a profound effect on future civil rights
litigation. A decision in favor of Patsy on either of these issues
will result in uniform treatment of litigants asserting their civil
rights and will require those jurisdictions with flexible no-
exhaustion policies to reverse their present policies. A decision
against Patsy will not only vindicate the Patsy court and those
jurisdictions with a flexible approach but will likely, over time,
result in restrictions on civil rights litigants' access to the
federal courts.
Joseph H. Chivers
the adequacy of the remedies and where the final administrative officials in the
state scheme must petition a state court for enforcement.
Applying these rules to the facts in Patsy, it is argued that the Board of
Regents never attempted to prove the adequacy of the remedies and that even
if they had, the fact that the Human Relations Commission, as the final adminis-
trative appeal, lacks enforcement authority renders the state scheme inade-
quate. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 39-43. For a discussion of the FIU ad-
ministrative grievance process see supra note 9.
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